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Norms, diplomatic alternatives and the social psychology of war support 
Aaron M. Hoffman1 





Abstract: Using experiments, we show that subjects who are asked about their support for war 
without being told about diplomatic strategies to deal with crises back military operations at 
levels consistent with people who are told that the alternatives to war are of low quality. In 
contrast, subjects who are told that diplomacy could work to resolve conflicts express less 
support for military operations. These results suggest that, in the absence of conflicting evidence, 
people premise their support for war on the assumption that leaders use force as a last resort. 
Implications for the study of success as an influence on public attitudes about U.S. military 
operations are considered.4 
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Roughly three months before launching Operation Iraqi Freedom, United States (U.S.) 
President George W. Bush held a meeting with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski. The 
Polish President’s support of war with Iraq was churning up anti-American sentiments in Poland 
and hurting his popularity. The protests were sure to be temporary, Bush assured Kwasniewski, 
because “[s]uccess helps change public opinion” (quoted in Woodward 2004, 275). Two weeks 
later, Bush delivered a similar message about success to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi: 
“We have put together a lethal military, and we will kick [Saddam’s] ass . . . This is going to 
change. You watch, public opinion will change” (quoted in Woodward 2004, 297). 
Several studies confirm President Bush’s belief that expectations of success increase 
support for military action even when the prospect of significant casualties looms large (e.g., 
Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). The evidence led 
Feaver and Gelpi (2004, 97) to conclude that Americans are “defeat phobic, not casualty phobic” 
-- a remarkable claim given the longstanding view that war support inevitably declines as battle 
deaths mount (Mueller 1970). Not only does it mean that democratic leaders can avoid tortured 
efforts to devise war plans that minimize casualties without sacrificing military effectiveness, the 
success research also suggests that democratic governments can use force more frequently than 
previously thought. Indeed, one review concludes that the results of the work on success 
challenges the Liberal claim that people are inherently skeptical of military action and restrain 
democratically elected leaders from engaging in war (Drezner 2008). 
 Yet, claims about success overlook evidence that people do not regard military 
achievement as an unalloyed good. In 2002-2003, for instance, 60% of Americans believed that a 
U.S. military victory in Iraq was likely (CNN/Time poll, November 13-14, 2002). Nevertheless, 




News poll, January 4-6, 2003). This apparent preference for diplomatic strategies mirrors a 
reaction Americans had during the prelude to the first Gulf War. As Mueller points out (1994, 
35), 54% of those polled registered support for war when the possibility of using economic 
sanctions against Saddam Hussein was not mentioned. In contrast, 46% of Americans backed the 
use of force when reminded that sanctions remained an option. 
 This sensitivity to cues about alternatives is not simply a question wording effect that 
complicates analyses of polls. On the contrary, research in psychology suggests that the 
availability of quality alternatives is an important predictor of people’s attachments to long term 
goals (Rusbult 1980). The work on success has not, however, considered how the availability of 
diplomatic alternatives to the use of force might influence war support. Instead, success’ effects 
have been examined without reference to the choices available to leaders, even though non-war 
options are often debated alongside proposals to use force. As Senator Edward M. Kennedy 
explained in stating his opposition to the second Gulf War, “Resorting to war is not America's 
only or best course at this juncture. There are realistic alternatives between doing nothing and 
declaring unilateral or immediate war. War should be a last resort, not the first response.”  
 We argue that studies of success that omit cues about alternative courses of action 
generate inflated estimates of people’s tolerance of casualties and support for military operations. 
Omitting information about the feasibility of diplomatic strategies can induce people to conclude 
that non-war courses of action are unattractive, strengthening their willingness to back military 
action. This happens, we think, because the public tends to believe that force is a tactic of last 
resort – to be used only after other feasible alternatives are exhausted. Because this principle 
operates in the background, people who receive no information about diplomatic alternatives are 




non-war alternatives are unattractive. In contrast, people who receive cues that suggest 
diplomatic alternatives are viable are likely to express less support for war. There may be people 
who dislike defeat so much they are willing to pay any price to secure military victory, but like 
Page and Bouton (2006), our work suggests that more Americans are cost conscious in foreign 
policy. 
We demonstrate what can happen when people are denied information about alternatives 
to the use of force through three experiments that pair replications of studies conducted by 
Feaver and Gelpi (2004) and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) with studies that cue subjects 
about non-war courses of action, but otherwise mirror the originals. Subjects who received no 
cues about diplomacy express a tolerance for casualties and degree of support for war consistent 
with subjects who are told non-war courses of action are poor substitutes for violence. In 
contrast, subjects in two of our studies who were told that non-war options are viable substitutes 
for the use of force were less likely than others to either express support for war or indicate 
casualty insensitivity. In the third study, our results suggest that war support is influenced by the 
interaction of cues about alternatives, success, and casualties. 
To be clear, it is not our intention to challenge claims about success’ effects on war 
support. Instead, our work is designed to use an established research tradition to demonstrate the 
effects of information about alternative courses of action on support. In this sense, our research 
builds on studies of success by identifying the conditions under which the allure of military 
victory is likely to generate the greatest enthusiasm for war and the conditions under which it is 
less likely to shape public attitudes. More generally, our work suggests that bias in estimates of 
public support for war may be an issue across a range of studies that do not account for the 





 While it was once thought that public support in the US for military conflicts inevitably 
declined in the face of American battle deaths (Mueller 1970), more recent work finds that a host 
of variables temper the effects of casualties on war support. Demographic factors like gender and 
race, for example, influence the public’s support for military missions with women and African-
Americans less tolerant of casualties than men and Whites (Eichenberg 2003; Gartner and 
Segura 2000). Casualty sensitivity, the reaction people have to battle deaths in terms of their 
support for military operations, also appears to be greater among people who are more likely to 
know the pain of war either personally or via friends and family (Karol and Miguel 2007).   
Beyond these individual-level determinants, crisis specific factors also influence the 
public’s reactions to casualties. Faced with the prospect of U.S. military action, Americans 
examine the underlying goal military action is supposed to achieve (the “primary policy 
objective” (PPO)) as well as the prospects for assistance from allies and international 
organization before backing the use of force. Operations designed to restrain the foreign policies 
of other states garner the most support from the public while missions designed to engineer 
regime change or bolster internal stability are viewed more skeptically (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson 
and Britton 1998). Similarly, the public appears to prefer multilateral operations to unilateral 
ones and missions that secure the endorsement of international organizations over ones that do 
not (Grieco et al. 2011; Kull and Destler 1999; Page and Bouton 2006). 
During military operations, levels of support for military conflicts appear to track the 
degree of elite consensus about an operation’s merits (Larson 1996). When leaders are 




casualties. However, public support for military operations erodes when elites disagree about the 
wisdom of war – an effect that runs along partisan lines (Berinsky 2009). That is, individuals 
support wars as long as leading members of their political party support those wars as well. The 
mass media’s coverage of elite cleavages seems to matter as well (Baum and Groeling 2010).  
Perhaps the most striking and controversial finding, however, is that expectations of 
success matter most in determining war support. In several studies, Feaver and Gelpi (2004) and 
Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) showed that expectations of success influenced (1) the number 
of battle deaths members of the public regarded as “acceptable” (Feaver and Gelpi 2004), (2) 
levels of support for initiating hypothetical military operations (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009) 
and (3) trends in support for military operations during periods of fighting in conflicts ranging 
from Vietnam to Iraq (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2005/2006, 2009). No other argument 
challenges claims about the US public’s casualty phobia so directly. On the contrary, previous 
research suggests that the public tolerates casualties only for short periods (Gartner and Segura 
1998). 
The notion that the US public cares more about losing than about casualties is supported 
by a variety of studies of US public opinion during American military operations. Eichenberg’s 
(2005) examination of every poll published between 1981 and 2005 addressing uses of force by 
the US military shows that public support for war is influenced by mission success, controlling 
for the “principle policy objective.” This result is echoed in Larson’s (1996) analysis and in work 
by Gartner (2008). Using several innovative survey experiments, Gartner found that the public’s 
level of support for war is sensitive to casualty trajectories. Short-term increases in the number of 
battle deaths reduce war support by leading the public to conclude that military operations are 




used to contextualize casualty counts are significant: when the ratio of US casualties to insurgent 
deaths is favorable, the public’s sensitivity to American battle deaths declines. 
Yet, there are reasons to question whether expectations of success influence pre-war 
attitudes as much as recent work suggests. The problem, as we see it, is that the questions used to 
examine success’ effects on public attitudes present scenarios in which the use of force is the 
only option under consideration. Feaver and Gelpi (2004, 106), for example, asked this question: 
When American troops are sent overseas, there are almost always casualties. For 
instance, 43 Americans were killed in Somalia, 383 in the Gulf War, roughly 54,000 in 
Korea, roughly 58,000 in Vietnam, and roughly 400,000 in World War II. Imagine for a 
moment that a President decided to send military troops on one of the following missions. 
In your opinion, what would be the highest number of American military deaths that 
would be acceptable to achieve this? (italics in original) 
The trouble with presenting scenarios in which the decision to use force is the only option 
under consideration is that it can lead respondents to infer that non-war solutions are impractical. 
Force is widely seen as an activity that should be pursued only if all other reasonable strategies 
have been exhausted. For this reason, respondents who are not told about the status of alternative 
courses of action are likely to conclude that the choices available to leaders are unattractive, 
causing them to increase their stated support for war. In short, it is doubtful that remaining silent 
on the availability of alternatives to the use of force is innocuous. On the contrary, the absence of 
cues about alternatives may incline respondents to support uses of force more strongly than they 
would if they knew diplomacy was an option. As a result, the work on success may overstate the 
degree to which the promise of victory fuels the public’s enthusiasm for conflict. 
 




In this section, we discuss how information about the availability of alternative courses of 
action influences attitudes about the use of force, beginning with the observation that 
governments are frequently able to use a range of strategies to address foreign policy challenges. 
Encouraging other countries to exercise restraint toward others, for example, can be achieved by 
forging alliances, purchasing arms, using force, and, in some cases, through diplomacy. Foreign 
policy decision makers, in other words, are often in the position of choosing among a variety of 
substitutable courses of action. 
In democracies, the public’s preference for one course of action over another can be 
expected to play a role in determining the policy approach leaders choose. In fact, it appears that 
the more people know about international events, the more aware they become of the availability 
of alternative courses of action, and the more pressure they put on leaders to shift from doing 
nothing to something (Regan 2000). Precisely how the public selects among the available foreign 
policy strategies is less clear.  
One answer to this question is found in the research on the psychology of commitment 
(see Koch 2011, for an application of this research to the issue of casualty sensitivity and voting). 
According to this work, a person’s willingness to express support for a foreign policy is the 
product of factors that either promote attachments or undermine them. The primary attractive 
forces are satisfaction, defined as “positivity of affect or attraction to one’s relationship” 
(Rusbult 1983, 102) or goal, and investments, the tangible (e.g., property) and intangible (e.g., 
reputation) resources that are subject to either loss or harm if objects of attention are damaged 
(Goodfriend and Agnew 2008). Satisfaction, which develops when a person’s subjective 




benefits associated with remaining committed to a particular target of attention. Investments 
intensify commitments by increasing the penalties associated with exit. 
The availability of quality alternatives, i.e. choices that challenge the status quo 
(Hoffman et al. 2009), on the other hand, are inversely associated with the willingness of people 
to commit to various goals and positions (Agnew et al. 2007; Le and Agnew 2003). As the 
quality of alternatives increase, the appeal of staying the course declines because the costs 
associated with doing something else or adopting a new attitude declines. Poor alternatives, by 
contrast, strengthen commitments by reducing the allure of change. In fact, the absence of either 
any alternatives or just good alternatives may induce individuals to maintain commitments they 
otherwise deem unsatisfactory (Rusbult and Martz 1995). 
Experimental work addressing the “War on Terror” is consistent with the premise that the 
willingness to support particular foreign policies is sensitive to information about the quality of 
alternative courses of action. Agnew et al (2007), for example, report that mean levels of support 
for forceful U.S. counterterrorism efforts decline by roughly twenty percent when alternatives to 
the “War on Terror” are described as good instead of poor (see Table 4, 10). Everts and Isernia’s 
(2005) analysis of national polls prior to the second Gulf War arrives at the related conclusion 
that support for the war increased as the viability of alternatives for dealing with Iraq declined. 
Yet, neither of these studies explores the consequences of withholding information about 
alternatives from respondents. 
As we indicated above, Mueller’s (1993, 81-82) analysis of national surveys administered 
after Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, but before fighting started in January 1991, is the one 




alternatives to the use of force. Mueller found that expressions of support for the use of force 
were generally lower in response to questions that mentioned economic sanctions as a method of 
dealing with Iraq than they were in response to questions that only asked about backing for 
military operations. Our analysis of polls about the use of force to counter Iran’s nuclear program 
suggests a similar conclusion. Mean public support for the use of force against Iran was 
anywhere from 8 to 41 percentage points lower in response to questions mentioning diplomatic 
efforts to resolve the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program than it was in response to questions that 
only asked about support for military action (details of this analysis are in the appendix). 
Nevertheless, there are limits to what secondary analyses of polls can tell us about the 
consequences of withholding information about non-war courses of action on the willingness of 
people to express support for military action. First, the questions that pollsters ask are not usually 
designed to examine how the availability of diplomatic alternatives influences support for the use 
of force. Instead, questions that juxtapose diplomacy and force are frequently intended to get 
respondents to identify the track they want the U.S. to pursue at the time the poll is administered 
(e.g., “In your view, of the five choices I read, what is the one best way for the United States to 
deal with the current situation in Iran? Use diplomacy to try to establish better relations, seek to 
impose international economic sanctions, threaten military action against Iran, take military 
action against Iran, the United States does not have to do anything to deal with the current 
situation in Iran”). Consequently, we cannot conclude that individuals who indicate a preference 
for diplomatic strategies either do not support the use of force or support the use of force less 
than they otherwise would if diplomacy was not an option. 
Second, pollsters are divided over how to gauge support for the use of force before the 




public support for the use of force against Iraq before the first Gulf War started in 1991. 
Similarly, we identified twenty-eight different questions about the public’s support for the use of 
force against Iran. Only eight of these questions were ever asked more than once and only four of 
the repeated questions were asked more than twice. Since even slight variations in the phrasing 
of conceptually similar questions can elicit different responses (Mueller 1994), the inconsistency 
in question wording means that it is difficult to determine with existing polling data whether 
changes in public attitudes about U.S. foreign policy are caused by attitude shifts or idiosyncratic 
lexical choices.5 
Finally, analyses of secondary polling data cannot tell us about the effect of denying 
people information about alternative courses of action. Pollsters are not in the habit of 
withholding information about the availability of diplomatic strategies from some respondents 
while supplying it to others. Consequently, we do not have comparable groups of people that we 
can use for the purpose of drawing inferences about the effects of questions about support for the 
use of force that do not include cues about available diplomatic strategies.  
These limitations on our knowledge are significant. Since Americans are notoriously ill-
informed about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and the details of specific crises 
(Berinsky 2009), one might conclude that denying people information about non-war courses of 
action has no influence on their support for military action. What Americans do not know cannot 
affect their judgments. Additionally, the prospects for military victory are independent of the the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Pre-war variation in the polling before the Iranian and first Gulf War cases does not appear to 
be unusual. Using IPOLL, we identified more than 1,000 polling questions asked between 1947 
and 2010. (We used the search terms (support or favor or oppose) and (force or war) under the 
topic heading “war.” See the appendix for the list.) This search confirmed that questions about 




prospects for diplomacy, further undercutting the idea that people’s support for the use of force is 
tied to the absence of information about diplomacy.  
On the other hand, the argument in favor of no relationship overlooks that discussions of 
the use of force in democracies, including the United States, take place against the backdrop of 
widely held beliefs about the appropriate conditions for going to war (Dixon 1994). Whether 
they are familiar with the Just War tradition (e.g., Crawford 2003) or utilitarian arguments that 
suggest low cost policies are preferable to substitutable high cost ones (Besanko and Braeutigam 
2010, 52), American citizens likely believe that leaders resort to force when there are no other 
ways left to defend U.S. interests. 
Evidence for the claim that Americans see the use of force as a tactic of last resort 
appears in national polls. In both October 2001 and December 2011, majorities of Americans 
(54% and 71% respectively) agreed with the statement that, “American military force should be 
used only as a last resort, after diplomatic and economic efforts have failed.” Based on the 
statements they make, modern Presidents appear to recognize that the public expects them to use 
force only after trying everything else. As Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue, the demands 
norms make on people to behave properly is revealed in the ways they justify their actions. For 
Presidents, this means showing that their decisions to use force pass the tactic of last resort test. 
As George H. W. Bush explained upon ordering divisions of the US Air Force to Saudi Arabia 
shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, “No [President] commits America's Armed Forces to a 
dangerous mission lightly, but after perhaps unparalleled international consultation and 
exhausting every alternative, it became necessary to take this action” (8 August 1990). Similarly, 
Bill Clinton announced his administration’s decision to join NATO airstrikes against Serbian 




possibly could to solve this problem peacefully” (24 March 1999). Even George W. Bush, who 
some accused of initiating a preventive war against Iraq, described the US as entering the war 
“reluctantly” and only after diplomatic efforts failed. 
The implication of the claim that Americans expect Presidents to use force as a last resort 
is this: efforts to study war support that exclude mentions of available alternatives generate 
estimates of support that are premised on the idea that leaders who are contemplating military 
action must be out of attractive options. Thus, unlike framing effects like the “sunk cost trap” 
(see Boettcher and Cobb 2009) and signals of support from abroad, which must be 
communicated to influence public attitudes, assumptions about diplomatic alternatives influence 
the attitudes of survey respondents even in the absence of specific cues about diplomacy. Hence, 
conclusions like “success matters most” in determining war support are based on a truncated 
range of situations defined by the absence of either viable or appealing diplomatic alternatives to 
the use of force. 
We can test whether people base their expressions of support for military operations on 
the idea that available non-war alternatives are either unavailable or unattractive experimentally 
by comparing the responses of three groups of respondents to questions about war support: 1) 
those who receive no information about diplomatic alternatives; 2) those who are told that the 
available diplomatic alternatives are of low quality; and 3) those who are told that available 
diplomatic alternatives are of high quality. We hypothesize that if people respond to questions 
about military operations assuming that force is used a last resort, then there should be no 
discernable difference in the levels of support expressed by those who are told nothing about 
diplomacy and those who are told that the available diplomatic alternatives are poor. By 




these missions will decline. Cues about diplomatic alternatives to war might be irrelevant to 
judgments about military operations. Saying that alternatives “matter,” therefore, means that 
informing respondents about quality diplomatic courses of action will depress their enthusiasm 
for military operations relative to those who are either told nothing about diplomacy or who are 
told that the available diplomatic alternatives are unlikely to work. 
 
Research Design 
 We examine the propositions that (1) the failure to cue respondents to the existence of 
alternatives to military action is tantamount to telling them that the alternatives to military action 
are poor and that (2) cues about quality alternatives to military action reduce support for war by 
replicating three experiments conducted by Feaver and Gelpi (2004) and Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler (2009). Experiment one replicates Feaver and Gelpi (2004). It focuses on the effects of 
success on the number of casualties subjects reported as “acceptable” in light of the operations’ 
goals. Experiment two and three replicate experiments conducted by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 
(2009). Experiment two examines the influence of cues about PPOs and success on expressions 
of support for hypothetical military operations. Experiment three examines the effects of 
expected casualty counts and military success on support for an unspecified military operation. 
Thus, the experiments we replicated allow us to examine the effects of alternatives across three 
different measures of war support and in the presence of different experimental treatments. 
  In each case, we paired a literal replication of the original experiment with modified 
versions in which subjects also received cues about the quality of alternative courses of action to 




(2009) were asked “Would you say you strongly approved, somewhat approved, somewhat 
disapproved, or strongly disapproved of the United States taking military action to replace the 
government of Yemen if it were threatening the shipping of oil through the Persian Gulf?” In 
contrast, subjects who received our experimental treatments were also told, “. . . and negotiations 
with the Yemeni government were likely [unlikely] to resolve the situation?”  
 We recruited volunteers for the studies from Purdue University’s undergraduate 
Introductory Psychology subject pool (students volunteered for a study titled “Perspectives on 
the Use of Military Force”). After signing up for the study, subjects were randomly assigned to 
one of the three studies. Participants received access to an experiment website and were allowed 
to complete the experiment whenever they chose from any location with Internet access. Subjects 
gave informed consent to participate in the studies and completed a demographic questionnaire 
that included items about their sex, age, and party affiliation. Upon completion of this 
questionnaire, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the various within-study conditions 
(e.g., no-alternatives (the literal replications); bad alternatives).  
In all, 637 people participated in one of our three studies. Men comprised 58% of our 
overall sample and the average age of the participants was 21.25 (S.D. = 1.25; range = 19 to 25). 
Roughly 47% of participants self-identified as Republicans and approximately 28% said they 
were Democrats. The remainder described themselves as Independents. We controlled for these 
characteristics (sex, age, and party identification) in each of our experiments. 
 Undoubtedly, some readers may be uncomfortable with our use of college students 
instead of a statistically representative sample of adults. There is a well-known list of warnings 




that it may be unwise to rely on studies that ask students to imagine themselves in unfamiliar 
roles (Mintz, Redd, and Vedlitz 2006). Given our objectives, however, these problems are 
unlikely to apply to our research. Our goal was to examine how cues about diplomacy influence 
decision making processes, not to estimate the size of average population effects. The judgments 
we are studying about diplomatic courses of action require neither specialized training nor 
specialized information. Every voting age person is able to offer opinions about the wisdom of 
war. Moreover, the age, intellectual maturity, and education of our subjects are unlikely to make 
them more sensitive to our prompts than other groups. On the contrary, our subjects responded to 
the experimental treatments as Feaver and Gelpi (2004) and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s (2009) 
subjects did. The exact magnitude of the relationships we uncovered may not generalize to the 
population, but the effects themselves are unlikely to be a function of our subject population.  
 
Study 1: The effects of alternatives on casualty sensitivity 
 Our first experiment replicates the work of Feaver and Gelpi (2004, see chapter 4). The 
original study assessed the number of casualties people considered “acceptable” in light of 
information about one of two PPOs: a mission to stabilize a democratic government in Congo 
and military strikes against suspected Iraqi nuclear facilities.6 We extended this research by 
including information about alternative courses of action, producing a two (military engagement 
scenario: supporting democratic government in Congo vs. military strike against Iranian nuclear 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  We changed the hypothetical target of US strikes from Iraqi to Iranian nuclear facilities because 
of the well-publicized absence of Iraqi WMDs. We do not believe this change is consequential. 
The results of our tests are consistent with the others we replicated that do not mention Iran. In 
addition, the effects of cues about alternatives persist in our Iran experiment even when we 





facilities) x three (alternatives: good, poor, no information) experimental design. The military 
engagement scenario was manipulated within-participant. Alternatives were manipulated 
between-participants with the exception that those in the no-alternatives condition never received 
information about substitute courses of action. Participants in the conditions involving cues 
about alternatives could receive any combination of good and bad alternatives information across 
the military engagement scenarios (e.g., good alternatives in the Congo scenario, but poor in the 
WMD scenario).  
Prior to the manipulation, participants read a paragraph taken from Feaver and Gelpi 
(2004) describing the approximate number of casualties the US military suffered in previous 
wars (see page six for text). They then received one of the two hypothetical military scenarios. In 
the no-alternatives condition, subjects read the following: “Imagine for a moment that a president 
had to act to stabilize a democratic government in Congo. In your opinion, what would be the 
highest number of American military deaths that would be acceptable to stabilize a democratic 
government in Congo?” In each of the alternatives conditions, subjects read an additional 
sentence. In the good alternatives condition, subjects read, “The president decided on a military 
option, but was overheard saying that his decision was a difficult one because there were non-
military alternatives including diplomacy or economic sanctions that might work.” In the poor 
alternatives condition, subjects read, “The president decided on a military option and was 
overheard saying that his decision was an easy one because the alternatives to military action 
including diplomacy or economic sanctions were unlikely to work.”  
After receiving the manipulation, subjects reported the highest number of American 
military deaths that they considered acceptable to accomplish the hypothetical goal. They then 




received. Finally, participants repeated the process described above in response to a second 
scenario before being debriefed and thanked for their time. 
 
Results 
 The responses subjects gave about the highest number of casualties they considered 
acceptable served as our dependent variable. Following Feaver and Gelpi (2004), we divided 
these responses into six categories (0 casualties; 1-50 casualties; 51-500 casualties; 501-5000 
casualties; 5001-50,000 casualties; more than 50,000 casualties) and analyzed the results using 
ordered logit. Subjects who failed our manipulation check were removed from the analysis. 
The results are consistent with the idea that people assume presidents contemplate using 
force when the prospects for alternative diplomatic action are poor (see Table One). Respondents 
who were told that there were bad alternatives to military action were indistinguishable from 
those in the no alternatives condition (Model 1: b=-.05, p>.05). That is, subjects who were told 
that diplomatic alternatives to the use of force were inadequate were roughly as insensitive to 
casualties as subjects who received no cues about alternatives at all.7  
[Table 1 here] 
In contrast, respondents who were told that there were good alternatives to the use of 
force found lower levels of casualties acceptable relative to those in the poor and no alternatives 
conditions (Model 1: b=-1.11, p<.01). Awareness of good alternatives, in fact, has the largest 
effect on casualty acceptance in our model. As Figure Two shows, below, the probability of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Collapsing the dependent variable into a binary variable (expected casualties: high vs. low) 




someone who received cues about good alternatives rating a given level of US casualties 
“acceptable” declines as the log of casualties increases. Good alternatives appear to have their 
biggest effect relative to the other cues in the zero to 500 casualties range. Subjects in the good 
alternatives treatment, for example, are more than ten percent more likely than those in the other 
treatments to say no (zero) US casualties are acceptable. In contrast, subjects in the bad and no-
alternatives conditions were more likely than those receiving the good alternatives cue to identify 
more than 500 US casualties as acceptable. 
[Figure 1 here] 
 Our results also confirm Feaver and Gelpi’s (see Table 1) findings regarding PPOs. 
Subjects in our treatment conditions were more tolerant of casualties in the WMD scenario 
(Model 1: b=.84, p<.01), a foreign policy restraint mission, than the Congo scenario, which 
focused on internal political change. The same result emerged when we focus on those who 
participated only in the literal replication of Feaver and Gelpi’s study (Model 2: b=.88, p<.01). 
Study 2: The effects of alternatives on support for military operations in Yemen 
 Our second study replicates Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s (2009, see chapter 4) work 
regarding the relative explanatory power of (1) success and (2) PPOs on the willingness to 
express support for the use of force across three hypothetical military operations in Yemen. As in 
Study 1, we extended the original design to include information about available alternatives. The 
result is a three (Yemeni government scenarios: threatening oil shipments through the Persian 
Gulf vs. engaging in ethnic cleansing and forced slavery vs. providing terrorist bases to al 




The Yemeni government scenario was manipulated within-participant, whereas 
alternatives were manipulated between-participants. Cues about success were not manipulated in 
this study. Instead, subjects were asked for their subjective estimates of the probability of each 
mission’s success. As in Study 1, participants in the no-alternatives condition never received 
information about diplomatic alternatives to ensure their experience mirrored that of Gelpi, 
Feaver, and Reifler’s subjects. In contrast, participants in the good and bad alternatives 
conditions could receive any combination of good and bad alternative information across the 
Yemeni scenarios (e.g., a participant could read about good alternatives in the oil scenario, good 
alternatives in the ethnic cleansing scenario, and poor alternatives in the terrorism scenario). 
 The setup for each scenario was the same. In the oil shipment scenario, subjects read the 
following: “Would you say you strongly approved, somewhat approved, somewhat disapproved, 
or strongly disapproved of the United States taking military action to replace the government of 
Yemen if it were threatening the shipping of oil through the Persian Gulf?” In the good 
alternatives condition, subjects also read, “...and negotiations with the Yemeni government were 
likely to resolve the situation?” whereas in the poor alternatives condition subjects also read 
“...and negotiations with the Yemeni government were unlikely to resolve the situation?” Next, 
subjects were asked to rate their approval of the use of force and to estimate the number of 
deaths they anticipated the US military was likely to suffer in the operation (0 (“0 deaths”), 1 
(“between 1 and 50 deaths”), 2 (“between 51 and 500 deaths”), 3 (“between 501 and 5000 
deaths”), 4 (“between 5001 and 50000 deaths”), and 5 (“greater than 50001 deaths”)). We also 
asked every subject in one of the manipulated conditions a question designed to check that they 
understood the cue they received. Participants repeated all these steps for the remaining scenarios 





We used the question tapping approval for the hypothetical missions as the dependent 
variable and restricted our analysis to subjects who passed the manipulation check. As expected 
(see Table 2), those in the bad alternatives condition (Model 3: b=-.14, p>.1) are indistinct from 
subjects in the no-alternatives condition. On the other hand, subjects in the good alternatives 
treatment are less likely to support the hypothetical missions (Model 3: b=-.82, p<.01). These 
results hold even when we collapse the dependent variable into two categories (support and do 
not support) to better match the dichotomous measures of support for military action typically 
used in national polls (this analysis appears in the on-line appendix). 
[Table 2 here] 
Being told nothing about diplomatic alternatives to war engenders levels of support for 
military operations that are on par with messages that indicate the prospects for successful 
diplomacy are dim. In contrast, being told that there are good alternatives to the use of force 
increases the probability of disapproving of a military mission by 12%. The effect of receiving 
good alternatives on the predicted probability of selecting one of the approval categories appears 
in Figure 2. As the figure shows, subjects who received cues about good alternatives are more 
likely to either “disapprove” or “strongly disapprove” of the use of force than subjects in the bad 
and no-alternatives conditions. Subjects in the good alternatives condition are also less likely to 
either “approve” or “strongly approve” of the use of force than subjects in the bad and no-
alternatives conditions. 




Once again, subjects also appear to react to our PPO manipulation as subjects in Gelpi, 
Feaver, and Reifler’s work whether they were exposed to cues about alternatives (see Model 3) 
or not (see Model 4). Humanitarian missions focused on ethnic cleansing (Model 3: b=-.81, 
p<.001; Model 4: b=-.92, p<.05) and missions designed to impose foreign policy restraint 
(Model 3: b=-1.92, p<.001; Model 4: b=-2.02, p<.001) received less support than missions 
designed to prevent al Qaeda from establishing bases of operation in Yemen. Our findings 
regarding expected success (Model 3: b=.80, p<.001; Model 4: b=.83, p<.05), which show it 
increases support for military operations, also match Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s results with the 
caveat that success is not the strongest predictor of support in our models. Expected casualties, 
however, are unrelated to support (Model 3: b=.07, p>.1; Model 4: b=.08, p>.1). 
 
Study 3: The effects of alternatives on support for an unspecified military operation. 
 Our final experiment replicates a study Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009, see chapter 4) 
designed to examine the causal effects of (1) anticipated casualty counts and (2) expectations of 
success on support for a generic military operation. Unlike Studies 1 and 2, subjects were not 
asked to factor mission objectives into their calculi or to offer subjective estimates of the 
probability of success. Instead, we exerted control over the values of all of the relevant 
theoretical variables (i.e., success, anticipated casualties, and alternatives).  
Subjects were recruited for the study using the same procedure used for Studies 1 and 2, 
but those assigned to this study were also asked to complete an additional questionnaire gauging 
their attitudes about using the American military to achieve nine possible U.S. foreign policy 




by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009, 75). Each of the items was scored on a four-point scale 
ranging from 1 (“strongly agree”) to 4 (“strongly disagree”). We then submitted these nine items 
to an exploratory factor analysis using the maximum likelihood method to extract factors. 
Eigenvalues of 3.88 and .44, accounting for 100% of the variance, suggested the presence of two 
factors.8 Items were included on particular factors if the factor loading was greater than .40 for 
that dimension and less than .30 for the other. Using these criteria, five items loaded on the first 
“Security” factor; the remaining five items loaded on the second “Humanitarian” factor. We used 
a promax (oblique) rotation because the two factors were moderately correlated (r = .31). 
Next, we randomly assigned subjects to one of the twenty-seven conditions generated by 
a three (confidence in military success: extremely vs. somewhat vs. not very) x three (estimated 
number of casualties: 50 vs. 500 vs. 5000) x three (alternatives: good vs. poor vs. no 
information) design. Each condition in this experiment was manipulated between-participants, 
with each subject receiving one scenario at random. As in Studies 1 and 2, participants in the no-
alternatives condition never received information about alternative courses of action, but other 
participants could receive any combination of information in the scenario they considered (i.e., 
confidence, casualty counts, and alternatives were assigned randomly). 
The scenario in the no-alternatives condition read as follows: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
are EXTREMELY/SOMEWHAT/NOT AT ALL CONFIDENT that the U.S. military will 
achieve this foreign policy goal, but estimate that FIFTY/FIVE-HUNDRED/FIVE-THOUSAND 
U.S. soldiers will be killed in this military action.” Those in one of the alternatives condition 
received the following additional sentence: “The Joint Chiefs also expressed the opinion that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  We kept the second factor even though its eigenvalue is below 1.00 to maintain consistency 




chances of diplomatic efforts achieving this foreign policy goal were GOOD/POOR.” 
Participants responded by rating their support for the mission on a four point scale, ranging from 
1 (“strongly approve”) to 4 (“strongly disapprove”). Subjects also completed a manipulation 
check question. Finally, we debriefed the participants and thanked them for their time. 
 
Results 
 We used the four-point measure of support for the mission as the dependent variable and 
analyzed our data using ordered logit. Once again, we restricted our analysis to subjects who 
passed our manipulation check. We also confirmed that the results are substantively similar after 
dichotomizing the dependent variable (see the appendix for these results). The design we used 
for this experiment, in which we manipulated cues about alternatives, confidence of success, and 
expected casualties, led us to expect a conditional relationship between the three factors. 
Specifically, we hypothesized that war support would be strongest when subjects were told that 
the JCS (1) considered the alternatives to war to be poor, (2) were extremely confident that the 
military operation would be successful, and (3) expected the use of force would result in no more 
than 50 US casualties. We also expected war support to be weakest when subjects were told that 
the JCS (4) considered the alternatives to war to be good, (2) were not very confident that the 
military operation would be successful, and (3) expected the use of force would result in 501 to 
5000 US casualties. 




To test this hypothesis, we generated a three-way interaction term and used it in our 
analysis (see Table 3, above).9 Subjects who were told either nothing about diplomatic 
alternatives or that the JCS believed the alternatives to war were poor, that the JCS were 
extremely confident in the probability of military success, and that the JCS anticipated no more 
than 50 casualties were significantly more likely to support war than those who were told the 
JCS thought the alternatives to war were good, were not very confident in the likelihood of 
military success, and anticipated 501 to 5000 US casualties during the operation (Model 5: 
b=1.53, p<.05). That is, the condition representing the combination of factors most likely to 
increase war support does so relative to the condition involving the factors most likely to depress 
war support. (We graphed the effects of poor alternatives, extreme confidence, and low 
casualties on the predicted probability of expressing support for war in the appendix.) 
We also found that subjects in the other conditions tended to express higher levels of 
support for the use of force than those whose support we expected would be lowest (Model 5: 
b=1.05, p<.1). These results are not simply a function of respondents’ trust in the military (see 
Table 3, Model 6). Since our subjects received all their cues about alternatives, success, and 
casualties from the JCS in this experiment, we thought it important to consider the extent to 
which their faith in the military influenced their reactions to this information. We assessed our 
subjects trust in the military with the following item: “Please indicate how confident you are in 
the US military: Very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, and not at all 
confident.” As might be expected, the more our respondents trusted the institutions and leaders 
of the US military, the more likely they were to support the use of force (Model 6: b=0.27, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Based on Studies 1 and 2, we collapsed the responses of subjects in the no alternatives and poor 




p<.01). The effect however, does not wipe out the combined influence of cues about poor 
alternatives, 50 or fewer casualties, and the JCS’ extreme confidence of mission success.  
Finally, we found broad consistency between our results and those reported by Gelpi, 
Feaver, and Reifler across the Security (Model 5: b=1.07, p<.01) and Humanitarian factors 
(Model 5: b=-0.56, p<.01), age (Model 5: b=-0.47, p<.1), sex (Model 5: b=-0.47, p<.05), 
education (Model 5: b=0.15, p>.1), and party identification (Model 5: b=-0.17, p<.05). This 
correspondence suggests that the interaction we observed between alternatives, success, and 
casualties is not easily dismissed as the product of a peculiar subject pool. 
 
Discussion 
 Taken together, our analyses suggest that asking people about their support for military 
operations and casualty sensitivity without providing cues about non-war courses of action 
encourages them to respond as if they were told the alternatives to war are unappealing. Across 
three experiments, subjects who received no information about diplomatic alternatives to the use 
of force responded to our queries about their tolerance for casualties and support for war in 
similar fashion to those who heard that competing courses of action were unlikely to work. In 
contrast, subjects in two experiments who were informed that diplomacy could work typically 
reduced their enthusiasm for war and willingness to say any US casualties were “acceptable.” In 
a third study, cues about alternatives appear to interact with information about success and 
anticipated casualty levels in predicted ways.  
The reactions we observed to cues about quality alternatives do not appear to be an effect 




expressions of support, we would have observed differences in the responses of subjects who 
were told nothing about alternatives and those who were told the alternatives were unattractive. 
Instead, it appears that people take the absence of information about diplomatic strategies to 
mean that the substitutes for war are of low quality. 
Our work also suggests that the effects of alternatives operate across several measures of 
support for the use of force. As Eichenberg (2005, 153) argues, using a single question to judge 
public opinion is ill-advised “because an infinite variety of question wordings on any issue is 
conceivable, and each is likely to yield a different set of responses” (see Berinsky and Druckman 
2007, for a similar argument). The range of questions we used and scenarios we presented, 
therefore, implies that assumptions about alternative courses of action operate in the background 
of many situations in which the use of force is a possibility. 
The results of our analyses also suggest two notable implications. First, when diplomatic 
alternatives are unavailable or unattractive, surveys of public attitudes about the use of force will 
accurately reflect the public’s commitment to those policies. However, when quality diplomatic 
solutions are available, but not mentioned, people overstate their willingness to back military 
operations – even ones that promise to be successful. Under these circumstances, studies that 
make no mention of alternatives may generate misleading results. Of course, in the real world 
perceptions about available alternatives will be influenced by elite debate on the subject and the 
degree to which observers trust the people involved in it. Our analysis suggests that cues about 
alternatives still matter, controlling for trust, but a more refined control for the credibility of 




Second, our analyses suggest that over time support for the use of force can be expected 
to vary inversely with changes in the quality of available diplomatic alternatives. Our 
experiments were not designed to examine this claim, but we probed its plausibility with the data 
we gathered on support for the use of force against Iran. As we show in Figure 3, average 
support for the use of force by the U.S. military against Iran between 2003 and 2012 appears to 
be sensitive to information about the quality of available alternative courses of action. Although 
the use of force was never supported by a majority of Americans during George W. Bush’s 
presidency (2001-2009), it is notable that a significant drop in support for military action against 
Iran occurs in 2007.10 At the time, the Bush administration was seen as committed to war with 
Iran and pursuing diplomatic action half-heartedly. Seymour M. Hersh’s article in The New 
Yorker (2006) reporting that the administration was devising an aerial bombing campaign of 
suspected nuclear sites in Iran helped confirm this sense. Yet, a release of the 2007 National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which concluded that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 
2003 because of international pressure, undercut the argument for war. As an aide to Vice 
President Dick Cheney told The Wall Street Journal, the authors of the NIE “knew how to pull 
the rug out from under us” (Solomon and Gorman 2008).11 
[Figure 3 here] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Disaggregating our data shows that support for the use of force reached its lowest level in polls 
taken in September 2007 (9%) and September 2008 (10%). We could not find polls taken more 
closely to the release of the NIE in December 2007. This data limitation means that we must be 
careful about making causal inferences from the patterns we uncovered.	  
11	  In 2009, the author of the 2007 NIE, argued that the Bush administration ordered the release of 
pages from the NIE in order to communicate to policymakers that diplomacy remained a viable 
option for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program (see Fingar 2009). Whether the White House 




While public support for military operations against Iran declined during the Bush 
administration, it generally increased during President Barack Obama’s first term (2009-2012). 
Obama came to office more optimistic than his predecessor about the ability of diplomacy to get 
Iran to give up its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Obama, for example, opened the door to direct 
talks with Iran over its nuclear program “without preconditions” (Borger 2009), a position 
George Bush rejected. Nevertheless, the inefficacy of diplomacy over during Obama’s first term 
appears to be associated with gradual acceptance that military action might be the last viable 
option capable of getting Iran to change course. Paraphrasing former CIA director Michael 
Hayden, military action against Iran is an increasingly attractive option because “no matter what 
the U.S. does diplomatically, Tehran keeps pushing ahead with its suspected nuclear program” 
(Haaretz, 25 July 2010). 
Beyond suggesting that cues about alternatives influence war support, our experiments 
also confirmed many of Feaver and Gelpi’s (2004) and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s (2009) 
findings. References to success typically increased our subjects’ willingness to express support 
for military operations while cues about casualties typically did not. The one exception was in 
Study 3, where the expected number of casualties emerged as one of a number of factors that 
combine to influence war support.  
Mission objectives also made a difference to attitudes about the use of force in the two 
studies that referenced these goals. In fact, varying the PPO cue had a bigger impact on our 
subjects than any of the other effects we examined. In Studies 1 and 2, military operations 
involving efforts to impose foreign policy restraint elicited more war support and greater 
tolerance for US casualties than either humanitarian missions or efforts to manage another 




tolerate US casualties were nearly seven times (6.8) greater for those who were told about a 
mission to eliminate Iran’s nuclear weapons than for those who asked about a mission to 
stabilize a democratic government in Congo. In Study 2, the odds of a subject supporting a 
military operation were more than two times (2.23) greater for those who were told the 
hypothetical mission involved eliminating al Qaeda in Yemen than for those who were asked 
about a hypothetical mission to prevent ethnic cleansing. 
We were unable, however, to reproduce all Feaver and Gelpi and Gelpi, Feaver, and 
Reifler’s findings. Success, for example, is the not the most important predictor of war support 
across the studies we conducted and the results associated with the demographic controls are 
sometimes at variance with Feaver and Gelpi and Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler’s work. While these 
“missed predictions” suggest success’ impact may diminish when alternatives are factored in, 
they are not cause for concern. The magnitudes of the relationships produced in our studies may 
not compare to those generated from national samples. Instead, this research is better equipped to 
illustrate one of the possible dynamics underlying the public’s support for war. 
Conclusion 
 In their influential work on casualties and war support, Scott Gartner and Gary Segura 
note that “the influence of wartime casualties on public opinion has been identified as the central 
tenet of democratic peace arguments” (1998, 279). Certainly this has been the operative 
assumption in Washington DC, where beliefs about the public’s sensitivity to American 
casualties frequently makes Presidents cautious about the use of force. As a senior European 




“The body-bag syndrome is a real problem now. It’s not that the American soldier doesn’t want 
to fight; the politicians won't let him” (Smith, Fenton, and La Guardia 2001). 
 Yet, there is evidence of a shift in attitudes among political elites about the public’s 
ability to stomach casualties and willingness to support military campaigns. Encouraged by 
evidence that the prospect of military success enables ordinary Americans to overcome their 
alleged squeamishness, Presidents are increasingly touting the inevitability of US military 
victories to bolster public support for military operations. In doing so, Presidents and their 
advisors are also challenging Liberal theory’s claim that the public is inherently opposed to war. 
 Although the research on success puts an end to the claim that the public cannot stomach 
war’s toll on society, it is premature to read the evidence about success as supporting the claim 
that people will overlook these costs if doing so advances the national interest. Our work 
suggests people assume decisions to use force are made when all other reasonable alternatives 
have been exhausted. When viable options remain, the promise of military victory is unlikely to 
make the price of war fade. Hence, the availability of viable diplomatic solutions to foreign 
policy problems will tend to undermine the public’s tolerance of casualties and support for 
military operations. On the other hand, the prospect of victory will exert its greatest influence 
when non-war solutions to foreign policy problems are either unavailable or inferior to military 
options. 
 While we made these points about the influence of alternative courses of action on public 
support for military operations using frameworks designed to test the success matters thesis, it is 
likely that our results also hold for elite cue theories of war support. Partisan messages about 




Measured levels of support based on party-based cues about uses of force are, therefore, also 
susceptible to the influence of background assumptions about alternatives. Information from 
trusted sources that suggests that non-war options remain viable is likely to deflate enthusiasm 
for war in similar was to the ones we observed in our work. 
In the future, it may be useful to explore how denying people information about 
alternative courses of action influences their judgments about the use of force across a range of 
questions pollsters ask prior to the start of hostilities. The sensitivity of people to differences in 
the ways questions are worded means that it is not clear how sensitive the results we reported 
above are to other dependent variables. It also may be useful to consider the role alternatives 
play in influencing war support during violent episodes. Presidents are often forced to explain 
why staying the course in foreign conflicts is superior to reducing the US military’s role in 
accomplishing particular objectives. In principle, alternatives to continued conflict should be 
appealing, but these chances also compete against investments that may encourage people to stay 
the course. The events that precede conflicts may also make diplomacy appear less credible. 
In summary, beliefs about the availability of viable alternatives to the use of force appear 
to influence public attitudes about the wisdom of war. Policymakers appear to recognize this. As 
Secretary of State Colin Powell argued during the deliberations over attacking Iraq, even if war 
was the US’ preferred outcome it could not be initiated without trying diplomacy first. 
Otherwise, “nobody would be with them – no Brits, no bases, no access or overflight 
agreements, European and Middle East allies all on the other side” (Woodward 2004, 157). The 
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Table	  1:	  The	  effects	  of	  alternatives	  on	  casualty	  sensitivity	  
	   Model	  1	  (with	  alternatives)	   Model	  2	  (literal	  replication)	  	  
	   	   	  
Good	  alternatives	   -­‐1.11**	   	  
	   (0.42)	   	  
	   	   	  
Bad	  alternatives	   -­‐0.05	   	  
	   (0.41)	   	  
	   	   	  
WMD	  scenario	   0.84***	   0.88**	  
	   (0.19)	   (0.33)	  
	   	   	  
Age	   0.51*	   0.43	  
	   (0.21)	   (0.37)	  
	   	   	  
Education	   -­‐0.88***	   -­‐0.86**	  
	   (0.22)	   (0.33)	  
	   	   	  
Sex	   0.21	   0.45	  
	   (0.33)	   (0.49)	  
	   	   	  
Cut	  1	  constant	   -­‐3.01	   	  
	   (3.02)	   	  
	   	   	  
Cut	  2	  constant	   -­‐2.47	   -­‐4.52	  
	   (2.99)	   (5.28)	  
	   	   	  
Cut	  3	  constant	   -­‐1.63	   -­‐3.78	  
	   (2.97)	   (5.21)	  
	   	   	  
Cut	  4	  constant	   0.06	   -­‐2.73	  
	   (2.93)	   (5.14)	  
	   	   	  
Cut	  5	  constant	   0.97	   0.97	  
	   (2.93)	   (5.04)	  
	   	   	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   0.05	   0.05	  
	   	   	  
N	   202	   82	  
*p<.05;	  **p<.01;	  ***p<.001;	  Std.	  errors	  in	  ().	  




Table	  2:	  The	  effects	  of	  alternatives	  on	  support	  for	  the	  use	  of	  force	  in	  Yemen	  
	   Model	  3	  (with	  alternatives)	   Model	  4	  (literal	  replication)	  
	   	   	  
Good	  alternatives	   -­‐0.82**	   	  
	   (0.28)	   	  
	   	   	  
Bad	  alternatives	   -­‐0.14	   	  
	   (0.24)	   	  
	   	   	  
Expected	  casualties	   0.07	   0.08	  
	   (0.14)	   (.2498397)	  
	   	   	  
Success	   0.80***	   0.83*	  
	   (0.19)	   (0.35)	  
	   	   	  
Humanitarian	  Mission	   -­‐0.81***	   -­‐0.92*	  
	   (0.22)	   (0.38)	  
	   	   	  
Foreign	  pol.	  restraint	   -­‐1.92***	   -­‐2.02***	  
	   (0.24)	   (0.42)	  
	   	   	  
Age	   -­‐0.13	   -­‐0.13	  
	   (0.20)	   (0.31)	  
	   	   	  
Education	   0.08	   -­‐0.28	  
	   (0.26)	   (0.50)	  
	   	   	  
Party	  ID	   -­‐0.20*	   -­‐0.18	  
	   (0.09)	   (0.12)	  
	   	   	  
Sex	   -­‐0.46*	   -­‐0.78	  
	   (0.23)	   (0.45)	  
	   	   	  
Cut	  1	  constant	   -­‐7.11	   -­‐12.54	  
	   (1.86)	   (3.39)	  
Cut	  2	  constant	   -­‐5.39	   -­‐10.58	  
	   (1.84)	   (3.30)	  
Cut	  3	  constant	   -­‐3.39	   -­‐8.37	  
	   (1.80)	   (3.20)	  
	   	   	  
Pseudo-­‐R2	   0.11	   0.13	  
N	   427	   156	  





Table	  3:	  Effects	  of	  success,	  casualties,	  and	  alternatives	  on	  war	  support.	  
	   	  	  	   	  	   Model	  5	   	  	   Model	  6	  
	   	   	   	   	  Poor	  alternatives,	  JCS	  extremely	  confident,	  0-­‐50	  casualties	   1.53*	  
	  
1.55*	  



































































	   	   	   	   	  Trust	  in	  military	  
	   	   	  
-­‐0.31*	  
	   	   	   	  
0.12	  



























	   	  
Pseudo	  R2	   	   0.08	   	   0.08	  
N	   	  	   404	   	  	   401	  
†p<.1;	  *p<.05;	  **p<.01;	  ***p<.001;	  Std.	  errors	  in	  ().	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Figure	  2:	  Probability	  Subjects	  Express	  Approval	  or	  Disapproval	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Figure	  3:	  Mean	  opposi@on	  &	  support	  for	  use	  of	  force	  against	  
Iran,	  2003-­‐2012	  
Oppose	  force	  
Support	  force	  
